HENRIK ENCKELL

Metaphor and the Psychodynamic Functions of the Mind

Doctoral dissertation

To be presented by permission of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Kuopio for public examination in Auditorium L 1, Canthia building, University of Kuopio, on Friday 1st March 2002, at 12 noon

Department of Psychiatry
University of Kuopio
ISBN 951-781-865-3
ISSN 1235-0303

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to investigate different levels of psychic elaboration through the theory of metaphor. Since it is a clearly defined subgroup of symbols, the metaphorical function sheds new light on the representational functions of the mind as well as on the methods and object of psychodynamic theory. In the theoretical part of the study some basic elements of psychodynamic theory are investigated through the theory of metaphor. In the clinical part, the inner individual world as revealed in psychotherapeutic treatments is studied through the same lens.

In psychoanalytic theory, psychic reality is regarded as ungraspable in itself. This reality is, however, manifested through the combination of representational means such as thoughts, affects, sense impressions and memories. The specific representational combination – analogous to the combination made in a metaphor – echoes a specific unconscious content seeking representation. The psychoanalytic investigation of psychic reality is thus comparable to the reading of metaphors.

In psychodynamic treatments unmastered psychic reality manifests itself most clearly through the transference phenomenon. The aim of the spontaneous transference is to avoid the aim of the vital linguistic metaphor, i.e., the creation of meaning. In the clinical patient-therapist setting, however, the occurrence of transference offers an opportunity to turn the avoidant effort of the patient into a living metaphor by using pertinent clinical data for the interpretation of the meaning of the avoidance.

In the clinical part, the conditions for a psychic metaphorization are investigated through clinical conditions where this function fails. A class of violent acts is inferred to be abortive attempts to keep up a psychic integrity through concretized metaphors, and the clinical record of a case of a boy with visual impairment shows how a vitiated psychic base obstructs the formation of functioning metaphors. This last case shows, however, that a psychotherapeutic treatment may support a development of the base conditioning vital metaphorical functioning.

National Library of Medicine Classification: WM 460

Medical Subject Headings: psychoanalytic theory; metaphor; psychotherapy; transference (psychology); violence; blindness
Our reading takes place in the very whiteness between the words, for this whiteness reminds us of the much greater space in which the word evolves.

Edmond Jabès
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all I wish to thank my supervisor Professor Johannes Lehtonen for his continuous support as well as for his constructive criticisms at different stages of my research work. Professor Lehtonen has been very generous with his time, and has shown a readiness to engage himself in this work, the value of which cannot be overestimated. In his ability to think and express himself clearly, Professor Lehtonen has been an admirable model. I am no less indebted to my second supervisor, Docent Simo Salonen, who very carefully has read various drafts of my manuscripts, bringing to light many implications I had not observed; Docent Salonen’s great learning and intellectual clarity, combined with a capacity for many-sided thinking has been an ideal for me. I am convinced this study would not have been completed without the help of my supervisors.

This work rests heavily on psychoanalytic thought, and I wish to express my gratitude to my teachers, supervisors and colleagues in The Finnish Psychoanalytic Society who have tried to help me acquire conceptual tools as well as clinical skills as a psychoanalyst. I also wish to thank both former and contemporary colleagues on the Editorial Board of The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, the community of which has fostered an understanding of the process of writing and reading scientific manuscripts.

A special thank-you goes to my co-author Donald Campbell, who very generously has offered me the rewarding possibility to share his ideas in a stimulating collaboration.

Sheila Smith and Moa Matthis have translated parts of this work, and the former has revised the language in the parts written directly in English; both have done work I very much appreciate, and I am convinced they have greatly improved the final result.

I greatly appreciate the work done by my official reviewers Ilpo Lahti and Bent Rosenbaum; their clear suggestions and criticisms have helped me improve the final manuscript. I also wish to thank all the relatives, friends and colleagues who have commented on different drafts of my manuscripts and been ready to discuss my plans; the possibility to share my thoughts has been essential, and many suggestions received have proven fruitful.

The Signe and Ane Gyllenberg Foundation, The Department of Psychiatry at the Kuopio University Hospital and The Foundation for Psychiatric Research in Finland have supported my work financially, for which I wish to express my gratitude.

In the end, however, the strengthening support provided by the love received from my wife and children is the base on which this study rests.
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS


CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................13

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.........................................................................................14

1. "Concretized" metaphors..............................................................................................14

2. Body ego, perception and thought through the perspective of metaphors.....................16

3. Psychoanalytic theory and metaphors.........................................................................18

4. The use of metaphors as a route to bodily experiences and unconscious fantasies........19

AIMS OF THIS STUDY.......................................................................................................22

SUBJECTS AND METHODS...............................................................................................24

1. Introduction..................................................................................................................24

2. The theory of metaphor applied in this study...............................................................25

3. The specificity of the applied metaphor model............................................................26

4. The reasons for choosing the metaphor model applied...............................................27

5. The application of the metaphor theory.......................................................................28

RESULTS

1. The object and investigatory method of psychoanalysis.............................................30
2. The concept and phenomenon of transference........................................33

3. On the conditions of a general metaphorization of the mind:
   concretized metaphors and the violent act ........................................37

4. On the conditions of a general metaphorization of the mind:
   the psychotherapy with a visually impaired boy..................................41

DISCUSSION..................................................................................................47

IMPLICATIONS ON CLINICAL PRACTICE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH..................................................................................52

REFERENCES...............................................................................................54

ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION

The mental experiential world is a representational structure, and the function of the mind is to produce and elaborate representations. Psychodynamic theory is essentially an instrument to be used in understanding how the psyche works with its representations in order to handle demands originating in both external and internal reality.

In psychodynamic theory the conceptual tool used to investigate the representational nature of the psyche has mainly been the symbol. The theory of symbols is an inclusive one, and the concept of symbol has come to encompass a broad spectrum of representational means. This might in some respects be an advantage, but on the other hand the very inclusiveness can blunt the conceptual tool.

The metaphor is a subgroup of symbols, more sharply delineated than the latter concept. According to the definition, a metaphor is an unconventional combination of words in which one field of knowledge is looked at through another, unexpected, one.

The following work is an attempt to study the psychodynamic functions of the mind through the theory of metaphor. It is hoped that the relatively precise conceptual instrument of the metaphor can widen – and, at the same time, define – our knowledge and understanding of the workings of the psyche.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

During the past six decades rather much has been written about the relevance of the theory of metaphor for psychodynamic theory and practice. In the psychoanalytic community, interest in metaphors has been especially marked since the beginning of the ‘80s. This interest is, however, not exclusive for this scientific community; applications of the theory of metaphor have become widespread in science in general, and – as Max Black said as early as in 1979 – nowadays the literature on metaphors and scientific reasoning, e.g., is extensive. Corresponding to this broadening application, lately the use of the model of this figure of speech on nonverbal representational means has also been pronounced, and this pertains as well to recent writings in psychoanalysis. Accordingly, today’s authors often apply this linguistic model on other than verbal representations (including thoughts, memories, feelings etc.), benefiting from the advantage of a precise, focussed, and elaborated conceptual model.

Psychoanalysts writing about metaphors have come from various quarters, and one can seldom find recurring discussions continuing the works of earlier authors. However, certain themes are discernible in the literature. Below I will try to give a general outline of what has been written on this matter, and I will do this by organizing the topic around four themes. These are: (1) "Concretized" metaphors, (2) Metaphors in relation to body ego, perception and thought, (3) Psychoanalytic theory and metaphors, and (4) Metaphors as a route to bodily experience and unconscious fantasies. Apart from this, two psychoanalysts (Rubinstei, 1972; Corradi Fiumara, 1995) have written within the theory of metaphor, mainly without application of this theory to observations on the workings of the mind. Due to their loose connection to psychodynamic thought proper, these texts will not be discussed here.

1. "Concretized" metaphors

It is generally acknowledged that psychotic persons and patients suffering from borderline conditions (Caruth & Ekstein, 1966) as well as persons who have suffered from massive traumatizations (Grubrich-Simitis, 1984) might form their experiences in metaphors subjectively not acknowledged as such. In these instances the metaphors are not experienced as indirect expressions showing something thus mediated, but they are experienced as direct revelations of a concrete, often ruthless, reality. Kitayama (1987), e.g., tells about a psychotic patient who said he could not sleep due to a light that was
altogether too bright. He claimed that the sun kept him awake. The patient, it turned out, had called his girlfriend "my sunshine". It was inferred that the thought of the girlfriend kept the patient awake. However, the patient seems to have experienced the sleeplessness as being due to the concrete sunshine. For this patient the metaphor does not show something indirectly (that the girlfriend feels like his sunshine), but expresses a concrete reality (the girlfriend is his sunshine).

In the literature there are many clinical examples of concretized metaphors (see, e.g., Ekstein & Wright, 1952; Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1956; Caruth & Ekstein, 1966; Aleksandrowicz, 1962; Searles, 1962; Lewin, 1971; Gammelgaard, 1998). One theme in the discussions has been how to handle these metaphors when they come up in psychotherapeutic treatment. Some authors have claimed it to be important to share the patients concretized metaphors (Ekstein & Wright, 1952; Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1956; Aleksandrowicz, 1962; Caruth & Ekstein, 1966), while others have stressed the importance of interpreting them (Cain & Maupin, 1961). Kitayama (1987) has suggested that one should interpret "within" the concretized metaphor, but strive towards a possibility to interpret it also from "without". It has been shown how a concretized metaphor during a psychotherapeutic treatment might become a genuine one, gaining the function of an ordinary, mediating, metaphoric expression (Searles, 1962; Shahly, 1987).

In the literature there is no broad agreement on the reasons for the breaking down of genuine metaphoric functioning (or "desymbolization" as Searles (1962) calls it). The breakdown has been connected to an inability to draw a distinction between inside and outside (Searles, ibid.; Kitayama, 1987), but also to a dedifferentiation between primary and secondary processes (Caruth & Ekstein, 1966). Grubrich-Simitis (1984), who has observed that victims of extreme traumatizations experience their world in concrete metaphors, explains this as a form of adaptive expectation: if your experience has been that anything can happen anytime, this leads to an experiential world where everything has to be taken literally. Leaving this concrete world is for these persons altogether too risky. In addition to this, some authors claim that the metaphors create a distance to the experiences depicted by them, and these authors see the concretized metaphors as signs of essential distancing defences (Aleksandrowicz, 1962; Caruth & Ekstein, 1966. See also Reider, 1972).

Generally speaking these authors have observed how genuine metaphoric elaborations might break down into "desymbolized", direct, and concretized, ones (a theme elaborated also by Segal (1957, 1991)). However, discussions about how these breakdowns are to be understood from a metapsychological point of view have been rare; that is, what do these breakdowns tell about the workings of the mind?
2. Body ego, perception and thought through the perspective of metaphors

In 1911, Freud put forward the idea that thinking is originally a psychic elaboration of motor action; tentative acts are the initial tools of thinking. Piaget and Inhelder (1958), basing their concepts on empirical studies, came to the same conclusion. In 1962, Szekely further elaborated this idea.

According to Szekely, the child senses his world through categories supplied by bodily sensations and actions. These first categories of thought, by Szekely called "archaic meaning schemata", are imprinted due to their topical importance to the child; as the bodily configurations are essential to a maintenance of an overall well-being, they become the first organizers of experience.

As an example Szekely relates how a toddler exclaimed "Car do big!" when he saw a parcel fall from it. In fact, every time this child saw something small fall from something big he conceptualised it the same way. Szekely underlines that the parcel falling is not a symbol for defecation; instead, the anal function gives meaning to the falling. Bodily configurations thus come to be the categories which give meaning to both inside and outside worlds. Many subsequent authors have recognized the metaphoric function of these corporeal schemes (Lewin, 1971; Ritvo, 1984; Shahly, 1987; Smith, 1992).

From a somewhat different perspective, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have elaborated this idea. According to these authors, body schemata (but also schemata originating in our social and cultural realities) function as largely unconscious conceptual structures underlying not only our general reasoning, but also our ways of perceiving, as well as acting in, the world. If a linguistic metaphor is a kind of model (Black, 1962) in which something more or less unknown is given shape through a better known field – through words we already know, and which might be more "tangible" or "concrete" – then the same can be said of the use of bodily models. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) underline the fact that we try to get a grasp of elusive experiences “by means of concepts that we understand in clearer terms” (p.115); through a tangible bodily pattern we can give meaning to and explore both experiences and the outside world.

Lakoff and Johnson attempt to show how reasoning is based on metaphoric structures (often taken from bodily schemata), and how our conceptual frameworks are dependent on precisely these structures. Later these same authors elaborated this theme in the context of neurolinguistics and neuropsychology (for a comprehensive overview, see Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), an extension that has aroused interest also in psychoanalytic authors writing about metaphors (Melnick, 1997; Borberly, 1998; Rizzuto, 2001).

In the literature, the theme of basic bodily structures has been linked to the theme of
characterological patterns (Arlow, 1979); a person might experience most of his world through a bodily scheme, e.g. in anal terms, and these terms can then be said to be this person’s basic metaphor – a metaphor through which he organizes both his impressions and ways of being. Melnick (1997) has elaborated this idea in an exposition on the relationship between character and erotogenic zones; character traits are metathoric expressions of “early experiences connected with one or another bodily zone, especially with the three that in the course of development become particularly eroticised” (p. 1011). Melnick speculates that the basic function of body schemata in perception and reasoning might find an analogy in the development of neuronal networks: “the brain’s being patterned on its experience of key bodily zones would explain the ubiquity of corporeal metaphors, both conscious and unconscious” (p. 1013).

In a work on “the bodily mind” and metaphoric functioning, Rizzuto (2001) reviews recent findings in neuroscientific research. According to these findings body configurations are the basic condition for the development of different levels of representing. Early, or primitive, perceptions organize more elaborate, or later, ones and during development much representational material is accumulated, both consciously and unconsciously. According to Rizzuto, the accumulated representations are the building blocks for the construction of both external and internal reality, and these are thus in the last reckoning mediated by the bodily configurations. Accordingly, the mind can be seen as metaphorizing the realities through the body.

All the above mentioned authors argue that bodily schemata organize experiences; through the bodily patterns the external as well as internal world is given form. Ritvo (1984) and Shahly (1987) again have discussed how people suffering from an eating disorder often seem to comprehend their bodies in a “plastic” way. According to these authors, these patients seem to use their bodies as metaphors: they configure their feelings through their bodies, and so their body images become a metaphor for their experiences. Body sensations and functions, as well as the body image, may thus serve as basic patterns which give meaning not only to somatic sensations and mental experiences, but also to the outer world. The “imprint” of these configurations is motivated by their primary importance to the child. As organizers of experience and the outer world they function like linguistic metaphors which through the well known and tangible give form to the new and elusive. As a metaphor, the body configuration helps the child to grasp what is difficult to understand. If Freud said that motor actions are the primary tools for thinking, the above mentioned authors can be said to claim that the bodily configurations are the basic categories through which the world is given shape.
3. Psychoanalytic theory and metaphors

If we need models from a known and "tangible" domain in order to shape elusive experiences, this pertains also to psychoanalytic theory. As Freud said in 1920: when we explore a reality difficult to grasp we have to use concepts borrowed from better researched fields of knowledge - i.e., we have to talk in metaphors. As Black (1962) as well as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have made very clear, all theory building is essentially an elaboration of metaphors, and psychoanalysis is no exception to this. In the psychoanalytic literature on metaphors, this has been one theme.

Pederson-Krag (1956) was the first to elaborate the topic more extensively. If psychology in general might have difficulties in describing its object of study, this pertains especially to a psychology which attempts to describe unconscious phenomena. In order to grasp the immediately unapprehensible, the psychoanalyst at work as well as the theoretician of psychoanalysis has to use concepts borrowed from more comprehensible spheres. Models taken from biology and warfare, e.g., make it possible to identify mechanisms working in the mind - workings one cannot describe in any "direct" way as one lacks the concepts for it.

In the same vein of thought, Lewin (1971) stresses that psychoanalysis needs metaphors as conceptual mediators as the phenomena it studies would otherwise stay ungraspable and undetected.

However, Pederson-Krag also sees a risk in the use of metaphors in psychoanalytic theory building. Metaphors might become reified, and in these instances they cease mediating a reality and become constructions the user thinks are direct expressions of it. Accordingly, Pederson-Krag sees the metaphors in psychoanalytic theory as for the most part valuable, but senses a problem: users might forget the metaphoric character of these conceptual tools. Carveth (1984) has elaborated this theme of the reification of metaphors in psychoanalytic theory from a deconstructionist perspective, and Melnick (1997) has found an example of it in the metaphor of embryology as used in developmental theory. Both authors see a risk of theory constraint if models become direct representations of reality instead of remaining conceptual instruments – i.e., metaphors.

Although metaphors might be "taken for real", Edelson (1983) claims that Freud did not use them that way. Through a close reading of the texts, he shows how Freud uses models taken from technology, biology and the social sphere, and how he could leave one set of metaphors for another. Freud understood the function of metaphors: they are to be used when they are able to visualize something, but to be abandoned when one finds better functioning ones.
The risk of reification was echoed in a discussion during the 70’s on the usefulness of metapsychology (i.e., the theory of the workings of the mind). Some authors - e.g. Schafer (1973) and Holt (1975) - wanted to substitute clinical concepts for all metapsychological ones. This discussion was linked up with a discussion on metaphors, as the authors mentioned saw metapsychological concepts as reified metaphors estranged from clinical understanding and clinical reality. In line with this, Schafer (ibid.) wanted to purge all psychoanalytic theory of metaphors.

In answer to this, Wurmser (1976) strongly defended the use of metaphors not only in psychoanalysis, but also in science in general. As an indispensable tool in scientific generativity metaphors are not to be dismissed; instead, metaphorical parts of psychoanalytic theory should be enlarged upon. Taking into account the view that metaphorical concepts may mediate a psychic reality otherwise undescrivable, psychoanalysis cannot afford a dismissal of them. According to Wurmser, the fact that some authors might misuse metaphors through a reification does not do away with the fact that these tools are indispensable when they are understood to be precisely tools.

Thus, though some authors have been of the opinion that metaphors should be expelled from psychoanalysis as they seem to become reified, and so estranged from clinical facts, most authors have seen the use of metaphors as indispensable in theory building. These authors stress that metaphors are instruments, used to explore a reality difficult to grasp.

4. The use of metaphors as a route to bodily experiences and unconscious fantasies

As mentioned above, the theme of concretization has been prominent in the psychoanalytic literature on metaphors. The same can be said of the theme of the possibility to use metaphoric expressions and configurations as a medium in the psychoanalytic process; many authors have seen this as a chance to reach unconscious experiences precisely through metaphors.

In the writings on this topic one can observe a slide from the specifically linguistic to a more general perspective. Previous authors have concentrated only on linguistic metaphoric expressions analysands might use, and have elaborated on how to use these, while more recent ones have seen that patients metaphorize their world in a more general sense. Especially Borberly (1998) and Rizzuto (2001) have stressed the very general character of “the metaphorical process”, this being a fundamental general principle in the workings of the mind. This can – as stated above – be said to be in line with a general broadening application of the theory in question.
Ella Freeman Sharpe (1940) was the first to discuss this theme (and the very first to discuss metaphors from a psychoanalytic perspective at all). She starts from the idea that psychological development goes from the "physical" to the "metaphysical", and says that the route of psychoanalysis goes in the opposite direction, i.e., from metaphysical speech back to the original physical experiences.

Sharpe sees the origin of language in the metaphoric expression which intertwines thought and sensation. For the adult the bodily origin of thought is, however, often forgotten. But the analyst can go "backwards" to the long forgotten psycho-physical matrix embedded in the manifest metaphoric expressions. A "re-vitalization" of metaphoric expressions might thus lead to an original sensual experience.

Voth (1970) also elaborates this topic. He stresses the importance of intensifying the psychoanalytic process, and sees a possibility to achieve a vitalization of characterological configurations through an active exploration of metaphorical expressions. Both Sharpe and Voth focus on linguistic metaphors.

In 1979, Arlow broadened the perspective to a look at general psychic functioning. In two earlier works (1969a, 1969b) Arlow had investigated the importance of unconscious fantasies, and had explained how these may organize the experience of reality (analogously to how Szekely as well as Lakoff and Johnson saw the perception of reality through bodily configurations). In 1979 Arlow links this to a metaphorizing activity. Analysands might experience the world through a specific scheme, according to Arlow an unconscious fantasy, and this scheme also organizes perceptions – among other things. Listening to the organizing activity might lead the analyst to the analysand’s unconscious fantasies modeling the experiential world. In a similar vein Ogden (1997) and Gammelgaard (1998) explore the analyst’s listening to the analysand’s general metaphorizing activity.

While all these authors focus on the patient’s metaphors, Reider (1972) and Shengold (1981) explore those of the analyst. Reider describes a stalled analytic case which opened up after an interpretation formulated in a metaphor, and Shengold describes how the analyst’s connecting activity can be seen as resembling a metaphorizing one. As the analyst connects different psychic elements, the analysand starts to weave connections (like in the reading of a metaphor where connections are made) and through this insights are gained. The process of gaining insight in an analysis is thus linked to the process of understanding metaphors.

In line with the authors mentioned above, Rizzuto (2001) has pointed out that metaphoric representations might lead the analytic couple to otherwise inefable experiences underlying representational layers that are easy to grasp. In addition to this, she sees the elaboration of metaphors to be a way of grasping potential senses of the self (these
being dependent on an experience of connecting activity). Metaphorizing structures connect diverse representational fields, and if this connecting activity is vitalized in an analytic process, it might lead to a self-sense that would otherwise only remain potential.

From somewhat different perspectives all these authors try to grasp something they see as essential to the psychoanalytic process through the theory of metaphor. The analytic patient builds his world through a scheme which can be seen as a metaphorizing one, and the analyst is to listen to the patient’s productions as he would to metaphors. The process of gaining insight in the analytic treatment is also explored through the process of building connections between the different parts in a metaphor, at the same time as this connecting leads to a realization of a sense of the self. As Szajnberg (1985) says: broadly speaking one can say that the patient brings forth his unconscious through various metaphorical expressions, configurations, and structures.

To sum up this review, I have organized the literature around four themes which seem to be the most prominent and recurrent in the writings on psychodynamics and metaphors. Many authors have discussed how the mind can be said to build metaphors, and how in a psychoanalytic process one can reach unconscious fields of experience through these productions. The scheme used to build these metaphors often comes from an experientially important domain, i.e., the body ego: the child uses this bodily configuration to make the world understandable. In the same manner psychoanalytic theory uses models from different regions to make the workings of the mind apprehensible and possible to investigate. However, ordinary, vital metaphorical thought might break down; in these instances metaphors do not mediate a reality, but seem to express it directly.

The theory of metaphor is a heterogeneous one. Although most authors seem to use the term to describe how something is looked at through something else, there is no broad agreement on a specific definition of the term, nor any unified perspective on how metaphors work. The results of the investigations reviewed here are, naturally, dependent on the reviewed authors’ understanding of the theory of metaphor. The conception of metaphor used in this study will be outlined below, and in this connection I will discuss not only how this conception is related to the one used by others, but also motivate the choice of the conception in question.
AIMS OF THIS STUDY

The aim of this study is twofold. First, the aim is to examine some basic issues in the theory of psychoanalysis through the lens offered by the theory of metaphor. Secondly, the intention is to use this same lens in the explorations of some clinical issues revealed in psychodynamic treatments. Hopefully, this work will build an arch with basic theory on the one end, and clinical reality on the other. The overall aim is to study psychoanalytic theory and practice through the theory of metaphor; to see what the former discloses when examined through the latter.

The study is composed of four parts, starting from the more theoretical and leading to the more clinical. Each part has its own, specific, aim.

The aim of the first essay is to study the object as well as the investigatory method of psychoanalysis. This part thus sets out to elaborate what is investigated through the psychoanalytic method, how this object manifests itself, but also how it is studied; these questions are explored through the theory of metaphor.

The first essay concludes that the reality studied in the psychoanalytic clinic manifests itself most prominently in the transference, the investigation of which is the hallmark of psychoanalysis (Lehtonen, 1999). The aim of the second essay is to investigate this most central concept and phenomenon of psychoanalytic treatment through the theory of metaphor.

The aim of the theoretical essays is thus to study the structure and function of the psychoanalytic method as well as to investigate to what extent one can see the mind – as looked at from a psychodynamic perspective – as metaphorizing; i.e., to study what this perspective of metaphors can reveal about clinical theory. The clinical essays, again, explore the breakdown and incomplete development of ordinary metaphorical functioning as these may be revealed in clinical practice. Thus, the aim of the clinical essays is study not only the clinical manifestations of a faulty metaphorical functioning, but also – and more importantly – the conditions for this function; it is hoped that the investigation of the broken function will shed light on the foundations of it. This is done in the context of a clinical experience manifested in psychodynamic treatments. The ultimate aim of this clinical section is, accordingly, to reach beyond the phenomenology of the ability to metaphorize to the foundations of it.

More specifically, the aim of the third essay is to study the violent act. The psychotherapeutic treatments of violent men have revealed a concomitancy of a breakdown of ordinary metaphorical sensing on the one hand and assaults on the other;
the aim of this essay is to study the link between these clinical phenomena.

The fourth essay is a case study of a psychotherapeutic treatment of a boy suffering from a visual impairment. This boy tended to perceive reality in a very concrete and factual way, understanding metaphors as concrete expressions. The aims of this study are to explore how a visual impairment affects a mental basis that is also related to metaphorical functioning as well as the possibilities to help the patient develop a more intact psychic foundation.
SUBJECTS AND METHODS

1. Introduction

The subjects and methods of this study can roughly be divided in two: those pertaining to the theoretical section on the one hand, and those pertaining to the clinical one on the other.

The subject investigated in the first two essays is the theoretical body of psychoanalysis, expressed and found in the relevant literature. More specifically, the subject of the first essay is the theory of the psychoanalytic object and method, while the subject of the second one is the theory of transference. In these two essays, the subject of investigation is thus on the one hand the body of psychoanalytic basic theory, and the body of clinical theory on the other.

The method of the theoretical part of this study is a conceptual analysis of the subjects in question. This analysis is carried out within the tradition of psychoanalysis, applying the theory of metaphor.

The subject of the clinical essays is the inner world of patients suffering from a faulty metaphorical function. This inner world is investigated through its manifestations in psychotherapeutic treatment settings. More specifically, the clinical material of violent men in psychotherapy at the Portman Clinic in London is the subject of the third essay, while the clinical record of the psychotherapeutic treatment of a visually impaired boy (treated by the author of this study) is the subject of the fourth one. The subjects from the Portman Clinic belong to a research project which has been evaluated and approved by the Ethical Committee of the Clinic. Regarding the fourth essay, the boy and his parents have given their permission to use the material for this study.

The method of the clinical studies is the one of psychodynamic theory, i.e., a method the aim of which is an attempt to understand the experiences of the individual patient, and an attempt to understand how these experiences are determined. In ordinary clinical practice, the tools of this method are the observations made by the therapist informed by psychoanalytic theory. In these studies, the observations made in the psychotherapeutic settings are, likewise, studied through the lens of psychodynamic thought.

Besides the general methodologies mentioned, all four essays apply the theory of metaphor. This is done for three reasons mainly: to elucidate the theory of psychoanalysis, to study the workings of the mind as these are conceptualised in psychodynamic thought, and to investigate the psychical conditions for a general metaphorizing ability of the mind.
2. The theory of metaphor applied in this study

The conception of metaphor applied in this study relies heavily on four authors. The first one is I. A. Richards (1936, chapters 5 and 6) who has written on metaphors from the perspective of rhetoric. The second one is Monroe Beardsley (1958, pp. 138-47; 1962) who has written on the subject as a literary critic. The third one is Max Black (1962, chapters 3 and 13), a philosopher of language. The fourth, and most important, is Paul Ricoeur (1978, especially chapters 3, 6 and 7) who has discussed the subject from a phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view.

These authors have in common an “inter-actional”, or “discursive”, view of metaphors. According to this view, the most simple metaphor does not consist of one word, but of two (given different terms by different authors). The two words do not “fit in” with each other, and most importantly, this leads to tension; thus, Ricoeur names his theory a “tension theory” (1978, p. 4). This seems to be the kernel put forward by these authors: a vital metaphor gives rise to tension, this tension leads to work which, in its turn, gives rise to a new meaning, and this in its turn creates a new vision of reality.

It might be most illustrative first to describe this inter-actional conception of metaphor through Black’s (1962, chapter 13) description of scientific models. There are different sorts of models: some more concrete, others more abstract. As an example of the former, one can look at the model of a knee joint. This shows in a concrete medium the structure and function of the anatomical part in question (leaving aside structures unnecessary for the purpose). The “visualization” is achieved by the use of concrete, tangible material.

Then there are theoretical models. Theoretical models use material not concretely tangible, but abstractly so: through an intellectually graspable medium they attempt to visualize - and explore - a field not expressible by other concepts. Maxwell’s description of electrical fields as an “uncompressible fluid” could be one example; concepts known by their familiarity or intellectual graphicness are used to visualize a domain lacking visualizing tools. This lack of concepts can be due to the fresh discovery of the domain, or to its elusive character.

How, then, is the “other” – elusive – domain studied through the familiar or tangible concepts? Through connections drawn between these latter ones. The graspable concepts allow an elaboration in which “visible” connections are woven, and through these analogous connections and patterns in the domain that has actually been investigated can be visualized. Metaphors function in a similar way: connections drawn between ordinary or tangible words come to show a reality undescrivable by other means. How does this happen?
Words are by nature polysemous, and each word has a "semantic field" – various potential meanings – to be found in the dictionary. In ordinary prose the context of the word delineates its actual meaning. In the poetic metaphor, however, words are combined in an unconventional way, and in the resulting "metaphorical twist" (Beardsley, 1962) the words do not "fit in" with each other. As a result of the "clash", the words' firsthand meaning is destroyed. But the "tension, contradiction, and controversy are nothing but the opposite side of the reconciliation in which metaphor 'makes sense'" (Ricoeur 1978, p. 195). In other words, the destruction of firsthand meaning makes a claim on the reader, who is forced to accomplish "semantic work"; i.e., an attempt to draw the "horizons" of the words’ respective semantic fields towards each other, or to weave connections between the fields in question. When this is successfully done, the metaphor "makes sense".

According to this, the metaphorical twist leads to semantic work in which new semantic connections are woven. This can also be described by the following metaphor: the horizons of the words are extended. The new connections or the semantic broadening is identical with a creation of meaning. Due to the semantic work done in the reading of a vital metaphor a new meaning is born. And this new meaning is able to encompass and express a reality hitherto unexpressible.

In conclusion, one can say that the combination of words discloses connections one has not been able to detect by other means, and the semantic weaving comes to mediate a reality not expressible in other ways. A reality is found through the metaphorical construction. According to this view, the metaphor is not a dispensable "ornament", but an instrument of great value in the investigation of reality.

3. The specificity of the applied metaphor model

This is the conception of metaphor used in this study. Specifically, it takes the poetic metaphor as its model (even when it studies the logic of scientific inventions), and it studies the creation of meaning as a consequence of the process taking place between words. This process is not self-evident, and cannot be taken as a matter of course. Moreover, this model makes a clear distinction between vital, poetic metaphors, and "dead", established or "worn-out", ones (these latter being metaphors already incorporated in the dictionary; metaphors one has forgotten are precisely this – chair leg, e.g.). Specific for the conception used in this study is thus an elaboration of precisely how new meanings are acquired in a dynamic process not taken for granted.
The conception of metaphor applied in the psychodynamic literature sees the mediating function of metaphors – how something is described through something else – as of topical importance. The process facilitating this function has, however, generally remained in the background, as has also the specifically meaning-creating abilities of new, poetic, metaphors; the very mechanisms conditioning the creation of new meanings and new views of reality have been meagrely thematized.

During the last decade, the work of Lakoff and Johnson has been influential, also in the psychoanalytic community. Their theory shows many similarities to the conception of metaphor delineated above; they stress the mediating function of metaphors, they elaborate a concept of “mapping” reminiscent of the process of semantic work; they divide the metaphor into two parts (“target” and “source” domains), and they also state that metaphors can open new views of reality: “New metaphors have the power to create a new reality” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 145). However, these authors concentrate on cognitive structures, and make only a small distinction between established metaphors and new, poetic ones (see, eg., Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, chapter 5) – in fact, they seem to focus on the former. This is probably due to their aim, i.e., to show how our cognition and culture rest on metaphoric structures already established.

4. The reasons for choosing the metaphor model applied

The reasons for applying the conception of metaphor outlined above are mainly two. First, one of the aims of this study is to investigate differing levels of general metaphorization: concretized metaphors, metaphoric structures uninvolved in psychic work (as in, e.g., the phenomenon of repetitive transference), and a metaphoric process where new meanings are discovered (as in, e.g., the psychoanalytic process). In making a clear distinction between established and poetic metaphors, in focusing on the differences between these, and in thematizing the process in which new meanings are revealed the metaphor theory delineated here seems to be a fruitful tool. A theory focusing on already established cognitive structures places less emphasis on the differences in dynamic processes that have been mentioned, something that also seems to be reflected in Melnick’s (1997) comment: “Lakoff and Johnson have shown that the use of metaphor, like most language use, calls on unconscious cognitive processes having, apparently, little to do with clinical psychoanalysis” (p. 1013).

Secondly, the theory applied in this study elaborates the processes taking place between the words comprising the metaphor; it thematizes the mechanisms working
between representational structures. As one of the aims of this study is to investigate the mechanisms of psychic work – i.e., the work done with, and between, representations – a conception focusing on the dynamic tension between words seems to be the most fruitful one.

5. The application of the metaphor theory

In this study, the metaphor is not perceived as an exclusively linguistic phenomenon, but as a general tool or mechanism in the workings of the mind. This is in line with the works of Arlow (1979), Corradi Fiumara (1995), Melnick (1997), Borberly (1998) and Rizzuto (2001). The mind can be said to combine various representative elements (thoughts, perceptions, memories, affects) like the poet combines words and the scientist concepts, and the following study proceeds from this extended and generalizing conception of metaphor. After the specification of the metaphor model used in this work, it might be motivated to integrate this with the aims of the study.

This work proceeds, thus, from the conception that the mind’s representative structures can be compared to words. The mechanisms working between the latter are, then, used to study the workings between the former. The theory of metaphor is mainly applied in three ways. First, the psychodynamic perspective is investigated. The use of metaphor theory is aimed at elucidating the very conceptualisation of certain basic issues in psychoanalytic thought; i.e., the metaphor theory is used to shed light on the very theory of psychodynamics. Secondly, metaphor theory is used to study various degrees of psychic elaboration. As seen in metaphor theory, the processes taking place between words is not a matter of course; certain conditions have to be fulfilled for new meanings to be created. Analogously, the processes that may take place between general psychic representations are not self-evident. The theory of metaphor is used to study various degrees of this psychic elaboration, and this is done in the context of generally accepted clinical theory. Thirdly, this work investigates certain clinical phenomena related to concretized metaphors. If the mind often has recourse to a general metaphorizing function in which something is seen through something else, this function has failed in instances of concretized sensing. The theory of metaphor is here used as a model through which this concretized sensing is investigated, and this is done mainly for two reasons: to understand the mechanisms working in concretized metaphorizations, and to understand the conditions for a vital, ordinary, metaphorizing function of the mind.

As the conception of metaphor used in this study is an extended one, the empirical,
clinical, material is not primarily a linguistic one. The patients’ use of representations – i.e., perceptions, thoughts, affects and memories, all representative structures comparable to words – are the object of study, and this use is manifested and found in the psychotherapeutic settings. To investigate this use of general representations the theory of the dynamics between words is applied. Accordingly, the clinical records revealing the subjects’ ways of constructing their experiences out of representations is “read” through the theory of how meanings are constructed out of words. This method naturally rests on the analogy between words and general psychic representations.
RESULTS

1. The object and investigatory method of psychoanalysis

The specific aims of the first essay, "Psychic reality and psychoanalysis; A look through the theory of metaphor" (Enckell, 2001a), is to study (1) the object of psychoanalysis, (2) the way this object manifests itself, (3) the specificity of the psychoanalytic investigatory method, (4) the place of the concept of "psychic energy" in psychoanalysis, and (5) how the explorative method of psychoanalysis is carried out in practice. All these questions are studied through the perspective offered by the theory of metaphor.

Psychoanalysis can be said to have started from a conception of two distinctive realities (Freud, 1900, chapter 7). The "outer", or "material", reality is the object of most of our senses (e.g., sight and hearing), but also of what today are called the natural sciences. In line with the Kantian tradition Freud saw this reality as in itself unknowable; we might know what our senses tell us, but this knowledge is always conditioned on the very categories of these senses. We know a picture provided by our sensual categories, not the material reality in itself.

Besides the material reality there is the psychic, which, according to Freud (Solms, 1997), in itself is unconscious. The sense organ of consciousness provides us with a picture of psychic reality, but in itself this reality is – just like the material one – unknowable. Accordingly, we have two realities, both in themselves unknowable and mediated to us only through more or less limited sense organs.

Although the psychoanalyst in clinical practice is interested in the factual life circumstances – i.e., the material reality – of the patient (Rangell, 1995), the focus is nevertheless on the patient’s psychic reality (Fonagy & Target, 1997). To get a better grasp of this main object of psychoanalysis, psychic reality can be studied through its structural conditions on the one hand, and its functional characteristics on the other. This is the first point to be made.

There are various models describing a structural stratification and hierarchy of the psyche. Common to them all is the conception that a primary mental "warp" is the condition for well functioning, more elaborated, levels of representation (Salonen 1979, 1989, 1992, 2000; Lehtonen, 1997; Sandler & Sandler, 1983). The primal psychic substrate – which catches the instinctual demands – is overlayed by mental contents easier to grasp, but the primary substrate is never superseded as it continues to function as a representational basis. And the same can be said of the functions governing the
workings of the mind; the primary process is overlaid by the secondary, but the former continues to function as the basic, and directing, force of psychic work (Opatow, 1997). In other words, a primary representational structure captures the demands of the body and transforms them into an unconscious wish (conceivable also as a basic relational configuration), and a primary mental function produces and directs the scene of satisfaction; these are the structure and function of psychic reality.

Accordingly, psychic reality is an unconscious wish (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). By itself, this reality cannot show and consciousness has to use means of its own to build a picture of it. To accomplish this, the mind uses various representations like the poet uses various words.

Psychic reality manifests itself through, e.g., dreams (Freud, 1900). Due to its topographical placement, the unconscious wish cannot express itself. Nevertheless, the disturbing wish strives to actualize itself in perception, and in order to accomplish this actualization it forces out a combination of recently imprinted reminiscences— the so-called day’s residues—to stage a picture realizing the fulfillment of the very same wish. The combination of preconscious representations pictures that which lacked representation by itself.

Now, the connecting activity of the dreamer can be compared to that of the poet. Combining various usual words at hand into metaphors, the latter gives form to an experience unexpressible by other means, while the former—likewise—uses a combination of representations at hand to picture a reality impossible to represent by other means.

Accordingly, psychic reality can be said to become manifest precisely through a connecting—or, metaphorizing—activity. As stated above, psychic reality cannot be grasped in itself, but by the use of representative elements—i.e., reminiscences, perceptions, thoughts or feelings—an image reflecting it can be produced. The elements in the picture are often faithful enough towards material reality, but the combination is idiosyncratic. Accordingly, the mind uses what can be called "realistic" elements in the actualization of psychic reality, and the central issue is not where the elements of the picture come from: the issue is what is shown in the combination of the elements.

This is the second point: psychic reality can be conceived as graspable and actualizable through a combination of representations at hand. Through this perspective it becomes clear that the central issue in the indirect representation of psychic reality is not the elements of the representation (or where these stem from), but the combination which is idiosyncratic as well as telling. The third point is the specificity of the psychoanalytic view of metaphors in scientific method.
In general science models are used to provide a picture of "outer" reality. As stated above, the scientist constructs a model like the poet constructs a metaphor, and this model is used as a means to investigate the object the scientist finds in front of him. The model, or metaphor, is directed "outwards".

By way of comparison, one can look at how the psychoanalyst approaches the dream. For the psychoanalyst also, the dream (which, as seen above, can be seen as a metaphor) is an investigatory instrument comparable to the model of the researcher in general science. However, while the general scientist uses his metaphor to study an object "out there", the psychoanalyst uses the metaphor of the dreamer to investigate what produced this very same metaphor. Both psychoanalyst and general scientist perceive their metaphors as investigatory instruments, but in psychoanalysis the "direction" of the metaphor is not "outwards", but "inwards". The psychoanalyst does not direct the metaphor as a telescope towards material reality, but searches the reality producing – and manifesting itself in – the metaphor. In conclusion, distinctive for psychoanalysis is the "direction" in which it looks through its investigatory metaphor: the general scientist studies a reality in front of it, the psychoanalyst studies the reality giving rise to it.

The fourth point concerns the possible justification of the concept of "psychic energy" in psychoanalytic theory. During recent decades the so-called economic point of view has been strongly criticized (see e.g. Gill & Holzman, 1976) for being an unjustifiable remnant of a quasi-natural conceptual system; this issue can be investigated through the proposed perspective of psychic reality.

It is generally acknowledged that the psychoanalyst searches for the meaning of the patient's productions (Ricoeur, 1970). However, besides their meaning, the productions also have an existence. For the patient, the symptom or the dream cannot just as well be there as not; both symptom and dream have a reality. This actuality/reality is, so to speak, forced out. Psychic reality forces out a combination of representative elements found in the manifest symptom or dream, and this result cannot be ignored. Now, the very reality, or existence, of the manifestations of the patient's psychic reality – the productions of which have been "forced out" – seems to be best comprehended if one takes into consideration the concept of "psychic energy". The very force of the unconscious wish makes the mind helpless, and this leads to a reaction; the very force makes psychic productions real, not just meaningful. The very reality in the psychic sphere can be understood as presupposing a conception of psychic force. Accordingly, the proposed model seems to justify the use of the economic point of view.

The fifth, and last, point concerns psychoanalytic investigatory praxis. The main instruments of the psychoanalyst are interpretations and constructions. The latter ones in
particular can be seen as the result of the psychoanalyst’s attempt to combine psychic elements which seem to be important for the patient, and which seem to have a – more or less hidden or potential – linkage. After hearing a construction, the patient might let the different elements "work" on each other, the result of which can be a discovery or reconstruction of psychic connections.

The connecting activity of the patient – what also can be called "psychic work" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973) – can be compared to the activity of the reader of a metaphor. While the patient lets different psychic elements work on each other, the reader lets the words in the metaphor do the same; both patient and reader become involved in a process where connections are woven.

In his book on the subject, one of Ricoeours (1978, chapter 7) concluding main points is a study of the reality disclosed by metaphors. The connecting activity of the metaphor creates a new meaning, but according to Ricoeur this new meaning also opens up towards a reality; a "second" – not obvious – reality is found through the connecting process. To conclude the subject, something similar can be said of the linking process in psychoanalysis. As the patient lets various psychic elements work on each other, a "second" – i.e., psychic – reality can be discovered.

2. The concept and phenomenon of transference

The first essay in this study deals with the object and investigatory method of psychoanalysis on a general level. As an opening of the study, it attempts to situate the psychoanalytic project in its theoretical context. The second essay, "Transference, metaphor and the poetics of psychoanalysis" (Enckell, 1999) develops the subject by placing it into the clinical world of psychoanalysis. This is done by investigating what is perhaps the most central and specific concept and phenomenon of psychoanalytic clinical theory, i.e., transference.

It is generally acknowledged that a transference – i.e., feelings and expectations related to an old object transferred to a present one – arises in all treatment relationships; specific for psychoanalysis is its way of taking advantage of the fact. The advantage taken is most of all an attempt to work within the transference: through the transference one can get a grasp of hidden experiences, and through the work with it these experiences can be elaborated with psychological development as a possible gain. Specifically, the aim of the second essay is to study the structure of transference on the one hand, and the function of it on the other. As in the other essays, this is done by means of the theory of metaphor.
Freud (1905, 1912, 1914, 1915, 1917, 1920) saw four main points in the development and phenomenon of transference. Firstly, transference is a transformation and displacement of the neurosis of the patient – what was a disturbing symptom in everyday life finds a new medium in the analytic relationship. Secondly, transference is a recollection in action; a repetition in place of a conscious reminiscence. Thirdly, transference is a vicissitude of desire. And fourthly, transference is a resistance against the psychic work of remembering.

After the works referred to above, the theory of transference was first integrated into the so-called structural theory (Strachey, 1934; Anna Freud, 1936, pp. 18-25), and then – to a slowly increasing degree – into object relations theory. In accordance with the latter, the internal objects of the patient are externalized and actualized in the analytic relationship, thus involving the experiential world of the psychoanalyst, too. The unconscious expectations of the patient are registered in the psychoanalyst through various reactions, and by exploring these reactions the analyst may get an understanding of the expectations giving rise to them (Heimann, 1950; Racker, 1972). The "hidden manuscript" of the patient may thus be put on stage in the psychoanalytic relation scene, and exploring the performed drama can serve as a way to the "text" informing it (Loewald, 1975; Sandler, 1976; McDougall, 1982).

The manuscript performed – or composition printed (Freud 1905, 1912) – has been conceptualised in various ways. Arlow (1969a, 1969b) has elaborated the concept of unconscious fantasies in this context, while Sandler & Sandler's (1983, 1984) model – referred to above – also has been applied on this subject. According to the Sandler's, a primary mental layer organizes strata containing more conscious experiences: the past unconscious cannot be retrieved in direct memory, but can be constructed through, e.g., the transference. Consequently, the past unconscious organizes the experiences staged in the analytic relationship. More recently still, the psychoanalytic authors applying findings in neuroscientific memory research (e.g. Clyman, 1991; Pally, 1997) seem to find a new variant of this overall model of transference. According to this last variant, a memory composition irretrievable in "evocative" memory images is manifested in repetitious procedures involving also relational patterns: a basic – but "hidden" – memory structure organizes an intersubjective configuration manifested in the transference.

In conclusion, what is manifested in the transference? To picture this one can imagine a psychic "textile". This textile is grounded on a warp essential for the web, but invisible in the completed fabric. Now, the web can be said to be woven of conscious or potentially conscious representations making up a complete mental experience. However, there are mental areas in which these elaborated representations fail (due to a failed
representational development). In these instances the basic mental actional matrix – the unconscious fantasy, the past unconscious or the procedural memory – becomes manifest, not in direct and conscious experiences (due to the lack of conscious, direct representations), but in a relational configuration. This configuration we call transference, and it manifests the psychic warp hidden in well developed mental areas.

"Transference" is a translation of "Übertragung", which in Greek is "meta-phoros": i.e., "transference" is identical to "metaphor". To investigate the nature of spontaneous transference in psychoanalytical practice, one can compare it to the structure and function of poetic metaphors. To begin with, there are some similarities between transference and metaphors.

Firstly, both transference and metaphors are compositions of representations at hand. Like anyone else, the poet is confined to his linguistic universe. Wanting to express e.g. an experience, the poet has to rely on the words at hand, and these words are defined by their general use. If the experience in question is badly covered by the words to be found, the poet has the possibility to combine words in a new and unconventional way, i.e., to create a metaphor. Thus, when the poet lacks direct expressional means, he combines available representations in his own – idiosyncratic – way; the poet takes "usual" words, but makes his own combination of them.

In transference, the patient – analogously – uses representations at hand. As stated in the first essay, the dream uses available day’s residues to actualize the picture of a wish. The transference is constructed in a similar way. The patient has registered – and registers – the analyst and the consultation room. These representations can, in analogy with the day’s residues, be called "perceptual residues", and they comprise representational elements ready to use. To actualize the picture of the primary – actional and relational – mental matrix, the patient combines these perceptions in his own, idiosyncratic, way. By combining representations at hand – ordinary words and ordinary perceptions – both poet and patient build up their metaphors and transference, respectively.

Secondly, the metaphor is constructed to show something. As stated above, Ricoeur (1978), among others, strongly argues that metaphors do not express something one could picture "directly". The metaphor is not a rhetorical ornament, but a "semantic innovation" (Black, 1962, chapter 3). According to this, the metaphor gives form to something which cannot be expressed in any other known way: first of all, the metaphor is a "visualizing" instrument.

Also transference pictures something. As in the case of metaphors, this something cannot be expressed in a "direct" way. Like the unconscious wish in the dream, the primary actional matrix (in the instances of a developing transference) lacks representations of its
own, and to actualize itself it has to "borrow" representational means. In the actualized configuration of the transference, the basic representational warp is visualized, although in an indirect way. Consequently, both metaphor and transference visualize a reality lacking direct expressive means.

As stated above, metaphors function like models. When we meet something new, we use a well-known medium through which this unknown reality can be made understandable. Well-known words are used to make another, otherwise ungraspable, reality comprehensible. Thus, a metaphor organizes our perception according to a pattern provided by this same metaphor.

In the psychoanalytic literature on metaphors, the body ego has been seen as a model functioning like a metaphor. Transference can be seen as having a similar function. The unconscious configuration of the patient organizes his or her world and relations, and these then tend to be stereotypically repeated. The manifest transference thus discloses a model working; the metaphor organizes reality through a well-known semantic domain, and the repetitive transference of the patient is likewise the result of an organizing mental pattern.

To sum up, there are similarities in the structure of metaphor and transference. The aims of the two are, however, different. In fact, they seem to be diametrically opposed.

In a living metaphor, the words in their unexpected combination start to work on each other. Characterizing a vital metaphor is a potentiality for the initiation of a semantic process in which a meaning is born.

To compare this to the clinical situation, the metaphor of a psychic "textile" can be used. Transference develops in a mental area of unbroken "warp", but incomplete "web"; there is a "hole" in the web. When the warp is activated due to instinctual intensification, the margins of the hole in the web (i.e., the incomplete, but existing, conscious representations) can – in principle – start to "work" on each other. This would be ordinary psychic work as a response to the instinctual activation. In transference, this work could be done – in principle – between the representations that after all exist, but in its place the composition prints a relational and actional pattern. Transference repeats a stereotypical configuration instead of initiating work comparable to the work initiated by the vital metaphor. The aim of the poetic metaphor is to create meaning, but the aim of transference is to avoid this. This echoes Freud's conception of transference as a defence as well as his idea of transference as a manifestation of the repetition compulsion.

The aim of spontaneous transference seems to be the one here mentioned. However, psychoanalysis is specific in its attempt to make the patient do something within his or her transference.
If transference is a repetitious enactment performed in order to avoid psychic work, the analyst tries to establish a frame in which this pattern is not just repeated, but also worked upon. The aim of psychoanalysis is to provide a possibility to "open" the stereotypical metaphors; to provide possibilities for the patient to initiate work in and through a transference which was established in order to avoid this very labor. The starting point and foundation stone for this labor is the ability to grasp the metaphorical character of transference. In other words, the understanding of the metaphorical structure of transference can be said to provide a necessary foundation for work the aim of which is to turn a repetition into psychic elaboration. 

"Thus, though spontaneous transference avoids the emergence of new meanings, psychoanalysis might turn the anti-poetic repetition into a living poem of mind."

3. On the conditions of a general metaphorization of the mind: concretized metaphors and the violent act.

The first two essays in this study show how the mind — generally speaking — metaphorizes. The opening paper studies the metaphorizing activity in a theoretical context, while the second one investigates the subject according to clinical theory. As seen above, the latter essay states that the metaphorizing activity might be stereotypical — as in spontaneous transference — but both of the theoretical essays investigate an intact general metaphorizing function of the mind. One can claim that these first essays study a well established function.

Psychoanalytical thought starts out from the assumption that all psychic functions have reasons as well as conditions (Tihkä, 1993, chapter 1). The following — more clinical and empirical — essays set out to investigate the basis of a general metaphorization of the mind, and this is done through a study of instances where this function fails. Thus, it is hoped that the study of the clinical conditions in question may shed light not only on the conditions themselves, but also on the basis of the function studied in the first two essays.

The starting point for the third essay, "Metaphor and the violent act" (Campbell & Enckell, 2001) is the observation made in a research project studying the psychodynamics of the violent act (Campbell & Enckell, ibid.; Glasser, 1998). In this research project, it has been repeatedly observed that perpetrators just prior to an assault often construct their experiences in what can be called "concretized" metaphors. The aim of the third essay is to search for possible links between the violent act on the one hand, and these concretized
metaphors on the other. The work is partly speculative, elaborating a model which seems to give meaning to the phenomena under study.

According to Stern (1985), the first mental representations — called “islands of consistency” — are connected in the first experiential activity, and precisely this activity is identical with the first and basic sense of self (the “emergent self”). In line with this, the linking activity gives rise to both self and object. The basis for this activity has been viewed from different perspectives, and in this connection the two conceptualisations also referred to above are presented: the “warp” of the mind can be seen as a vicissitude of primary identification (Gaddini, 1982; Green, 1983; Salonen, 1989) giving rise to a “frame” on which later representations can be connected or as the body ego functioning as a primary mental substrate on which all later mental activities rest (Lehtonen, 1997).

The linking activity itself can be viewed from the perspective of metaphors; if the metaphor combines words, the psyche combines representations. As has been concluded above, this also seems to be a perspective implied in the psychoanalytic theory on, e.g., both dream and transference; the mind might combine day’s or perceptual residues to actualize a configuration lacking representational means — and this is comparable to the work of the poet.

This faculty of general metaphorization is a most valuable one as it binds instinctual tension in psychic work. During stressful situations — in the face of, e.g., the threat of a psychotic breakdown — the faculty might, however, break down. A failing differentiation between self and object leads to an overall difficulty in keeping up distinctions, and this makes a connecting activity impossible as connecting presupposes differentiating borders. In these situations the subject faces the threat of a psycho-economic catastrophe and the loss of an experience of integrative wholeness (as well as a failure in reality-testing), but may try to steer clear from these dangers by the means formerly found effective. The subject may, thus, continue to use a general metaphorization, but the function of this has now changed. The person facing a psychotic breakdown may well dream and have a transference, but these change from being — at least potential — symbolic structures into configurations not experienced as symbolic ones. In order to keep up an integrative whole the subject might thus use a linking means which now, however, lacks the ability to construct a configuration having a symbolic function.

The end result in these processes is so-called “concretized” metaphors, i.e., metaphorical constructions lacking a symbolic function. What has formerly been a configuration in which separate domains are connected becomes a construction comprising two fields identical with each other. Between these no connections can be woven, and the metaphor comes to present a reality (instead of representing it). Segal (1957) has called the
phenomenon “symbolic equation”, while Searles (1962) – underlining the functional transformation in psychotic breakdowns – describes it as a “desymbolization”.

Certain forms of violent acts have been observed to be concomitant with a concretizing transformation of the metaphorical function. A search for the link between these two phenomena can be initiated by a look at the developmental roots of the acts in question.

Originally, disturbances in the physiological homeostatic balance give rise to bodily reactions like screaming, clenching of fists, kicking, and waving of arms. These originally chaotic “calls for help” gradually become organized into behavioural schemes actualized by situations in which the child is threatened by a psycho-economic upheaval he or she cannot cope with. These reactional patterns are, originally, automatic motor responses which, however, gradually turn into iconic configurations presenting the experience in question. Accordingly, the reactional act becomes a factual presentation of the threatening experience.

The bodily schemes might develop further into what Szekely (1962) – as referred to above – has called “archaic meaning schemata”. In these instances the body configuration becomes a scheme through which inner and outer worlds are given form. The bodily pattern is thus originally an automatic motor response, turns into a factual presentation of an experience, and might become a representational scheme through which a reality is configured.

For the infant, upheavals in the homeostatic balance are most threatening, and the reactions are consequently dramatic. The behavioural patterns – especially the object-directed ones – are for the observer often violent ones, but from a subjective point of view they are adaptive means to regain a most essential balance. In his research study on serious violent crimes, Tuovinen (1973) has found that homicides often seem to be triggered by a threat towards the body ego subjectively experienced as a threat of imminent destruction. If this is so, the violent act can be seen as an adaptive means to steer clear from a threat to the experience of narcissistic wholeness and integrity.

In line with this, the violent act can be seen as the result of representational regression. Due to a threat towards the body ego, the basis for a representational configuring fails, and the end result is an iconic presentation of the experience; i.e., a factual act. For the observer this presentation is a destructive one, but for the perpetrator it is a configuration saving him from a fragmentation. In sum, the violent act can be seen as a concretized presentation of a sensed reality the perpetrator defends against through this very presentation.

The once-a-week psychotherapy of two violent men is presented to illustrate and study the presented model. Mr Giles, it appeared, resorted to violence whenever he felt
"engulfed" by his girlfriend. A wish to "invade" the girlfriend gave way in its intensity to an experience of "drowning", and this experience could not be contained in symbolic form, but became a lived – concrete – experience. To fight his way out of this engulfment, Mr Giles attacked the girlfriend he perceived as suffocating.

During the treatment it turned out that Mr Giles at the age of 8 had suffered from a painful and immobilizing rheumatic fever. During this time, he had been nursed by his mother. Since he was immobilized Mr Giles had very few means to handle his confusing and forbidden instinctual needs, at the same time as a link between physical and psychological threats was established. The experiences during the illness can be seen as echoing still earlier experiences of being left alone with threatening needs.

The experience of being left alone led to an impulse to get "something more" from the mother, and this impulse was dramatized as an invasion. Later in life, intimacy with the girlfriend led to a similar wish. The intensity of the wish led to a "realization" of it, and in the experience of being engulfed Mr Giles fought his way out. Thus, the violent act was an attempt to handle a concrete experience.

Mr Wilson, on the other hand, did not seem to attempt an "escape" by violence. In states of experiential isolation – especially in sensorial deprivation – Mr Wilson attacked "to find someone, something, anything". Being left alone led to an experience of loss of bodily boundaries and an experience of a threatening "blackness". To avoid a psychotic fragmentation, Mr Wilson punched this concretized "blackness". Having been hospitalized during childhood, and often left alone by a narcissistically pre-occupied mother, Mr Wilson easily felt isolated from vital supplies. To reach out for these, Mr Wilson resorted to attacks. Thus, while Mr Giles fought his way out of a suffocating entrapment, Mr Wilson attacked to retrieve a contact with a life-giver.

From this clinical material, certain points are picked out and discussed. Mr Giles perceived his overwhelming wishes to intrude as an engulfment, i.e., as a concrete result of a concrete act; Mr Wilson’s experience of isolation led to an experience of "blackness" concretely cutting off any vital bodily contact. Both men seem to have linked physical threats to psychic ones, and the result seems to be a tendency to perceive inner dangers in accordance with a concretized body scheme. This is the first point. Secondly, these configurations are not perceived as metaphors in the ordinary sense, but as factual threats: Mr Giles does not feel like being engulfed, but experiences a real engulfment. For both men the threat is a real threat to the body. Thirdly, the concrete metaphors seem to inhibit a psychotic deterioration. Although concrete, the metaphors keep up a cohesive configuration, and we can speculate that this saves the men from a fragmentation. Fourthly, both men are quite articulate and may thus afterwards be able to give a relatively
detailed version of the situations in which the assaults took place. Although this is
difficult to decide, one may suspect that the experiences related were less represented
in the factual assault than in the more elaborated form narrated in the subsequent
psychotherapeutic sessions. In line with this, the factual acts can be viewed as very
concretized metaphors of an experience the men were unable to represent by other
means than actional configurations; as the linking activity had broken down due to a
dedifferentiation of subject and object the configuring made possible by the body ego
matrix is laid bare and resorted to. Fifthly, for both men the violent acts are defensive
attempts.

To conclude, the destruction of the weaving function seems to lead to two reactions.
On the one hand, the matrix becomes activated – or “laid bare” – as a direct presenting
agency of the instinctual threat, and on the other the perpetrator comes to use the body as
a means of defence against the threat in question. As a concrete presentation, the assault
can be called a cold and dreary poem of the body.

4. On the conditions of a general metaphorization of the mind: the psychotherapy
with a visually impaired boy.

In a study on the experiential world of the blind Gunmar Karlsson (1999) has made
a distinction between two sensorial classes. Only two senses, i.e., tactility and sight,
provide a direct contact with things. Other senses naturally also give information about
the outside world, but in themselves they do not provide an experience of the existence
of objects. For the sighted adult this might be difficult to understand as e.g. sounds seem
clearly to tell us when somebody is moving in the next room, but this knowledge is
dependent on the fact that hearing in this instance already ”rests” on the primary senses.
The constitution of the object world is dependent exclusively on tactility and sight.

This finding has alerted the author of the present study to the possibility of viewing the
primary senses as providing a mental substrate as a foundation comparable to the one
presented in the first three essays of this study. To investigate what such a comparison
might bring to light, the psychotherapy with a visually impaired boy is presented.

”I want to know, too”; Psychotherapy with a visually impaired boy” (Enckell, 2001b)
firstly sets out to investigate how the loss of vision influences the experiential world as
presented in a psychotherapeutic setting. Secondly, the aim of this essay is to study how
this world was transformed during the treatment. If the primary sensual substrate can be
compared to what above has been called the ”warp” of the mind, the loss of one of the
primary senses probably influences not only the apprehension of objects, but also the general metaphorization of the mind. If an intact primal matrix is a basic pre-requisite for the ability to view something through something else as well as the condition for a psychic linking identical with psychic work, the factors influencing the primary sensual substrate ought to influence the abilities mentioned; this supposition naturally rests on the possible congruence between primary mental matrix and primary sensual substrate. This study sets out to study the relevance of making such a link at the same time as it tries to throw some light on psychical conditions that easily go undetected in the sighted – in this instance, especially, the conditions of metaphorizing.

As an introduction, some developmental challenges met by the visually impaired can be identified. Firstly; as already hinted to above, blind children have difficulties in constituting objects, and actually many (Nagara & Colonna, 1965) never take the step into the object world. Taking into consideration the differentiation between primary and secondary senses this is understandable. Being dependent on tactility alone to provide a primary representational substrate, this object-constituting matrix grows relatively slowly. This seems to be confirmed also by the finding that blind infants react on sound cues alone substantially later than sighted ones (Fraiberg et. al, 1966). Secondly, when objects are constituted, separation becomes a problem. A visually impaired child who starts to lean on objects becomes utterly helpless when left alone, and this easily also interferes with a development leading to autonomy. Thirdly, in order to establish a reliable contact with both world and parents, the blind child uses concrete means. For these children, only a tangible contact seems to be reliable, and other presentations of the world easily become meaningless. Fourthly, the identificatory processes of the blind are somewhat restricted due to the limitations on sensory input, at the same time as the concretization mentioned above seems to pertain to also this function; the child easily identifies by concrete imitations.

Peter started his therapy with the author of this study at age 8. The parents sought help primarily due to the restlessness of the boy: whenever there were people around, Peter noisily demanded to be heard and answered. A twice-a-week psychotherapy was initiated, and the treatment came to last for almost five years. The observations made during the work can be organized around four themes.

(1) Very early in the treatment Peter expressed a most intense wish to enter variants of what can be called the “other room”. This “other room” was different places Peter felt himself shut out from: the room behind the locked door in the first office, the room behind the curtain in the second one, the refrigerator and the oven, the answering machine etc.
All these places were more or less connected to the person of the therapist, and Peter’s fervent wish to get into them could be viewed as an attempt to get a grip on what he felt to be elusive in the therapist; including, most importantly, the therapist’s mind. However, Peter did not seem to conceive of these rooms as ordinary metaphors for the therapist’s mind, but probably perceived them as concretized metaphors: for Peter, the other room and nothing else was the place to inhabit and investigate. Thus, although the wish to get into the different places could – from an observer’s point of view – be viewed as a metaphor for a wish to inhabit the therapist’s mind, the very concreteness and uncompromising attitude in relation to it speak in favour of a view according to which Peter was unable to see something through something else; i.e., to use ordinary metaphors.

The wish to get a grip on the place behind the door can be understood also another route. As Peter perceived the therapist to be important, the latter was conceived as regulating him. In an attempt to grasp the reality he felt to be directing his experiential world, Peter wanted to get a hold of all of the therapist.

Peter had been totally blind until the age of 6 months, and after that he had gained some vision. This vision was, however, slowly diminishing. Peter’s intense wish to hold on to the object can be understood against this background. As objects were important to him, one can suppose that Peter had built a primary matrix, but this can be surmised to be a relatively weak one (due to the congenital blindness and the following visual impairment). As the vision was diminishing and the matrix was weak, the risk of losing the object world was imminent; hence an urge to cling to it.

(2) From the start of the therapy Peter persistently asked the therapist questions. Especially in the beginning of the treatment, the answers did not satisfy Peter; after an answer, a new question ensued. Also in the beginning, the questions concerned the outer reality and often enough they seemed to appear to interrupt the therapist. Later – when the most fervent questioning had subsided – Peter initiated the questioning near the end of the sessions. During the final period of the therapy the questioning escalated dramatically.

For Peter, this questioning seemed to be multi-determined. For the visually impaired the presence of the other is not easily determined; this concerns both physical and psychical presence. By asking questions and getting answers, Peter confirmed the presence of the therapist in both respects. Through this, one can understand the ensuing rhythm in the questioning: when he was about to lose the therapist, the questioning became more intense.

As mentioned above, at the age of 6 months Peter had gained some sight, and
this perceptual mode had become important to him. As his vision had deteriorated, Peter seemed to start using others as "eyes". By getting answers regarding – among other things – the concrete world Peter could hold on to an experience of functioning vision. Accordingly, the questioning about concrete things seemed to be a functional compensation for a deteriorating sight. Besides this, the questioning seemed to serve as a way of turning inner dangers into outer, these latter ones becoming configured by getting answers concerning factual things. This last point can also be viewed as a variant of concretized metaphorization: unable to make a vital metaphor of an inner danger – a metaphor in which connections could be woven in psychic work – Peter fell back on an experiential modality in which the outer reality, as a concretized metaphor, had to be grasped in a factual configuration.

(3) During the sessions Peter often became very excited. To handle this Peter could jump on both feet, but he often also used the toilet for what appeared to be the same reason. Later in the treatment the therapist also became involved in Peter's attempts to regulate the excitement.

Peter developed a piece of drama in which a boy demanded to be allowed to stay up to watch television, while the father harshly commanded the boy to go to bed. It was important to Peter that his father be strict. At the end of the play Peter surrendered and went to his room. This game, which was often to be repeated, could be interpreted as Peter's attempt to regulate an exciting wish to "watch", and this regulation was reinforced by the involvement of an outer object, i.e., the therapist.

For some time Peter was pre-occupied by the therapist's refrigerator and oven, eagerly investigating the processes of heating up and cooling down. This interest could be understood as being motivated by a wish to make an acquaintance with the therapist's means to regulate his excitement; by this very concrete route, Peter seemed to be attempting to get a grip of how to "heat up" and "cool down".

(4) This last point links up with Peter's more general tendency to experience in a concretized mode. As stated above, visually impaired children often identify in what seems to be a concrete manner. Peter's pre-occupation with refrigerator and oven can be viewed from this perspective, but it was also noticeable how directly Peter wanted to imitate things the therapist did; Peter wanted concrete examples of ways the therapist had handled different dangers, but he also performed acts he had seen the therapist doing.

More generally, it was clear that precisely the concrete world was meaningful to Peter; for Peter, imagining things seemed to be meaningless. This can be understood if we are
aware of the conditions of the visually impaired. For the blind, anything can happen anytime, and this leads to a direct and "naked" reliance on a reality that is too often startling. Besides this, leaving the trustworthy tangible reality for different forms of fantasy involves the risk of becoming excited beyond a capacity to handle this by the means at hand. Keeping to a concrete reality one in one way or another can "touch" seems thus to be most meaningful and safe for the visual impaired, and this pertained also to Peter.

This links up with the question of concretized metaphorization. If one sees something through something else – as in ordinary metaphors – one leaves the very concrete reality at hand. One could perhaps see Peter's way of holding on to the concrete facts as a variant of the findings of Grubrich-Simitis (1984), also referred to above: severely traumatized persons cannot leave a concrete reality which may intrude at any time. Hence, they do not metaphorize.

Through the material provided by this treatment, can one observe any changes that can be related to a strengthening of the "warp" of the mind? On the overt level, Peter's symptoms receded substantially, and this was also the motive for finishing the treatment. Some changes indicating an improved mental armament were also observable in the consultation room.

Firstly, Peter's questioning was modified. Although this questioning in its intensity and persistence was considered one of the presenting symptoms by parents and teachers, it became more moderate during the treatment. More importantly, not only the contents but also the function of the questions seemed to change. While the questions in the beginning to a fair degree appeared to be an endless effort to get a grip on an outer reality reflecting inner dangers, or an effort to get a grip on concretized metaphors presenting these dangers, Peter later started to ask questions concerning emotional experiences as well. In this way the questioning lost some of its compulsive, fruitless and repetitive character and took on the function of a developing conquest of an emotional reality. This development can be viewed as a decrease in the use of concrete metaphorization.

Secondly, Peter seemed to lose some of his tendency to act on the spur of the moment. Later in the therapy, Peter interrupted the therapist more seldom, and seemed to be able to listen for longer periods. This might be connected to a developing capacity to give some form to instinctual dangers. Although these in the beginning were instantly transformed to outer ones and directly acted out, Peter later started to use the therapist in configuring the impulses in question. This could be observed, e.g., in an attempt to shape anal impulses in a transferred medium. Thus, Peter started to use a metaphorical configuring differing from the earlier, very concrete one: when outer reality earlier had been a direct and
concrete reflection Peter compulsively reacted upon, he now was able to contain an impulse through a shaping in which one medium came to stand for something else.

Thirdly, some possible ways of handling the loss of objects seemed to develop. During the final period of the therapy, Peter often talked about a period in which he experienced a transient total loss of vision. Although at the beginning of the treatment Peter denied any problems in connection with separations, at the end he seemed to be able to configure some aspects of the experience of being left alone, an experience most intimately connected to the loss of vision.

Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, Peter manifested a new conception of having experiences and memories. As said above, Peter initially acted directly, but during the treatment a seemingly new ability appeared: i.e., Peter started to talk about what he experienced, but he also started sharing various memories. Through this, one can speculate that Peter developed an increasing ability to form "evocative" (Pally, 1997) memories, as well as a more general ability to contain impulses in an emotional experience.

In conclusion, all these observations seem to tell the story of a developing capacity to catch instinctual impulses in a warp conditioning mental experiencing. This comes close to the observations and reflections made by Omwake and Solnit (1961) in connection with the psychotherapeutic treatment of a blind girl. According to these authors, the girl developed an infantile amnesia at the same time as memories began to be experienced as precisely memories. The build-up of a primary mental matrix enables the representation of emotional experiences and memories; that is, a psychic life involving representational connecting – comparable to a metaphorization – becomes possible.

These findings seem to confirm the relevance of linking the primary mental matrix with a primary sensual substrate. It is possible to speculate that Peter, due to his congenital blindness and post-operative visual impairment, had a poorly developed primary sensual substrate, and that he used a concretized metaphorization found in persons suffering from an incomplete psychic “warp”. In addition to this, Peter initially also seemed to be unable to use a psychic connecting activity conditioned also by an intact warp. These findings suggest a congruence between primary matrix and primary sensual substrate, at the same time as one can see the possibility, by way of a psychotherapeutic treatment, to strengthen the psychic base conditioning a vital metaphorization.
DISCUSSION

As stated above, in the former literature on metaphors and psychoanalysis four themes are discernible. These are: (1) the phenomenon of "concretized" metaphors especially in the experiential world of psychotic patients, (2) the use of metaphors in psychoanalytic theory, (3) the body ego as a metaphorizing medium giving shape to both world and experiences, and (4) the investigation of the patient's metaphors as a route to his unconscious experiences. The work here presented is connected with all of these four themes, but it may also be said to offer a perspective uniting them all. The unifying perspective is a metapsychological model of the mind; this model outlines how a living general metaphorization of the psyche can be viewed as the condition for psychic vitality, at the same time as it draws a picture of the structural and functional conditions of this ability. If this model is the outcome of this work's theoretical investigation, the clinical part is an empirical study of states of a failing metaphorization, thus investigating also the condition of this function.

The study presented here is an integrative one, exploring many fields of psychoanalytic theory and practice through the theory of metaphor. This broadness makes a very detailed comparison with the works of other authors impossible, but some general remarks can be made concerning this issue.

This study is specific in its conception of metaphor. Even though some – especially recent – psychoanalytic authors have been detailed and thorough in their exposition of the theory of metaphor, no one has started out from an elaborate model of the poetic metaphor encompassing an analysis of the dynamics between words and the ensuing creation of meaning. Arlow (1979) and Borberly (1998) refer to the functions of poetic metaphors in particular, but do not combine this with a more precise analysis of the mechanisms of semantic work. Shengold (1981) uses a model of poetic metaphors coming close to the one applied in this study; through this he studies the process of gaining insight, without, however, linking this to a metapsychological perspective.

Besides the model of just precisely poetic metaphors, the conception used in this study is still more specific in its differentiation between various kinds of metaphors. The differentiation between vital and established metaphors has not formerly been made clear in the psychoanalytic literature, and is thus specific for this investigation. Both of these distinguishing qualities in the conception of metaphor lead to specific findings.

The whole study started out from the issue of the psychoanalytic object and the way this object is studied in psychoanalysis. By way of an application of the theory of metaphor it was concluded that the mind can be seen as metaphorizing – combining
different representational elements – and that the psychoanalytic object can be perceived as the agency demanding precisely this connective activity. The activity in question is the vicissitude of the helplessness we experience when confronted by our instinctual demands, and it is just this helplessness that makes the psyche real. The specificity of the psychoanalytic discipline was also looked at from this angle. If it can be generally acknowledged that metaphors function as investigatory instruments, psychoanalysis is specific in its apprehension of the “direction” of its metaphors: it studies what lies “behind” the metaphors, i.e., the reality producing them.

This can be said to be the general and theoretical result, the result of the first essay: psychic reality - i.e., the psychoanalytic object - can be seen as an agency that it is possible to study through creations it has forced out. In a recent study, Rizzuto (2001) has touched upon similar findings in making it clear that the psychoanalytic project takes advantage of the patient’s general metaphors in exploring his psychic reality. She does not, however, clearly connect the semantic work with a metapsychological model as in the present study. Drawing a parallel between representational fields and words, and linking this to the metaphor model specified above, makes the refinement of a metapsychological picture inherent in psychoanalytic theory possible. Accordingly, the metaphor model presented here leads to a refinement of precisely a metapsychological model supplementing former findings.

The general, theoretical, model is specified, concretized, and put in the context of clinical theory by the second essay. In this, the phenomenon of transference is investigated, and the conclusion is that the psychoanalytic object reveals itself in the therapeutic relation – which offers the most favourable conditions for study – precisely in this phenomenon. The patient in treatment comes – partly – to combine perceptual material in a stereotypical way, thus creating stereotypical metaphors, and one aim of a psychoanalytic or psychotherapeutic treatment is to “open” the repetitive metaphors established to obstruct psychic life. By providing possibilities to open the transference, the treatment may thus enhance representative vitality and promote psychical, i.e., representational, development. In other words, the second essay shows how the aim of the treatment is to turn the repetitive transference into a living poem of mind.

Many authors have drawn attention to the link between metaphor and transference (the first one being, in fact, the philosopher I. A. Richards who made some comments upon it as early as in 1936); while most have done this in passing, Szajnberg (1985) has devoted a whole paper to this subject. As stated above, the metaphor conception used in this study sees a clear distinction between established (“worn-out”) metaphors and vital ones. This distinction made the view of transference found in this study possible. While former
authors have seen the similarity between linguistic metaphors and clinical transference, the distinction mentioned here opens up the view that repetitive transference is an established metaphor not experienced as such (like the worn-out metaphors found in the dictionary), while a psychoanalytic treatment might turn it into a vital one leading to new meanings. This specification and supplement to the general analogy between metaphor and transference is made possible by the model of different kinds of metaphors.

As can be seen from the review of the literature it has been generally acknowledged that the mind essentially metaphorizes in its building of representations, and there is broad agreement that transference is a result of this function. Specific for the totality of the theoretical part of this work is the model of the conditions of the function in question.

According to the model presented here the psyche can be visualized as being composed of two "layers". The first and more fundamental one is called the "warp" of the mind: a matrix remaining invisible in the completed "fabric" of the psyche, but a condition and a base for the psychical "weaving". This fundamental representative "net" can be seen as the structure underlying a general metaphorization that may also be conceptualized as a "weaving" of conscious representations. A lack of conscious representations – a "hole" in the web – results in a stereotypical actional and relational metaphor (which still is, however, a metaphor), but a "hole" in the warp results in an inability to keep up a psychological coherence. In sum, a fundamental mental matrix is the basic prerequisite for the most essential metaphorizing function of the mind.

This model relies on earlier ones representing a hierarchical structuralization of psychological functions, most notably those of Salonen (1979), Sandler & Sandler (1983) and Lehtonen (1997). The original contribution of this work on the general hierarchy model and the different levels of psychic elaboration is the perspective of general metaphors providing a conceptual tool that refines the view of the mechanisms in question.

The ability to elaborate something through something else is, however, not a given. As stated above, a lack of representations at hand – i.e., conscious ones – leads to a stereotypical relational configuration in which representational weaving leading to new meanings – although potentially possible – has come to a standstill. In a psychotherapeutic or psychoanalytic treatment the connecting activity can, however, be activated. The clinical part of this study is an investigation of conditions in which a metaphorization of the mind has broken down, or where it has never developed. An investigation in this field gives a perspective on the structure underlying a general psychological metaphorization, a structure ordinarily remaining invisible in the background: when the metaphorization fails, this structure can be said to become manifest.

As stated above, "concretized" or "broken" metaphors have been the object of many
former studies. Searles (1962) and Kitayama (1987) viewed the phenomenon as a
vicissitude of the breakdown of the differentiation between inside and outside, while
Caruth & Ekstein (1966) saw it as the manifestation of a breakdown of the distinction
between primary and secondary processes. These general remarks on the mechanisms
leading to concretized metaphors have not been further elaborated in a metapsychological
context by these or other authors.

Regarding the existence of the phenomenon, two main conclusions are drawn in this
study. The first one concerns precisely the breaking down of an ordinary metaphor into a
concretized one. If a basic warp is the basic condition of a general, vital, metaphorization,
this structure is “laid bare” and directly manifested when the weaving function has
been “torn” due to a de-differentiation of self and object. When the differences between
representational fields have been abolished, no connections can be made, and the result
is a presentation of factual reality in concretized metaphors. While the transference
is a stereotypical metaphor not experienced as one, this phenomenon still relies on
representations being “borrowed”, and through these representations something is given
form; as distinguished from this, the concretized metaphor has lost the possibility to see
something through something else due to the breakdown of differences. According to this
idea, the transference is a potential symbol, while the concretized metaphor implies a loss
of symbolical experiential function.

Secondly, the use of concretized metaphors seems to involve an effort to keep up a
cohesive configuration. This effort is partly abortive since the basic condition – i.e., the
intact possibility to make connections – is failing. The findings of the third essay suggest
that the violent act as an analogue to the concretized metaphor represents an attempt to
defend against what seems to be a threat of psychological disintegration, and this is done
through a direct use of the body analogous to a concrete, and iconic, presentation. If the
body ego ordinarily functions as a mediating structure that makes a vital metaphorization
possible, a threat of disintegration activates this structure to act directly; instead of
becoming involved in the building of a representative structure, the body is used in direct
and concrete defensive action that is not a representation, but a presentation.

The concluding essay also studies a condition of broken metaphorization; here, this is
done in connection with the experiential world of the visually impaired. The conclusion
is that the visually impaired have difficulties in building the basic structure necessary
for the constitution of the object world, and this is linked to the difficulty of these persons to
apprehend and experience through metaphoric structures. Through the clinical material
provided by a treatment of a visually impaired boy it is, however, possible to suggest that
the basic matrix can be consolidated. In the therapy presented it was observed that the boy
gained the ability to elaborate experiences in a psychical medium, and it can be suggested that this newly won faculty was connected to a stabilized primary matrix. A consolidated mental warp can be said not only to help in constituting objects, but also in connecting mental experiences, thus facilitating a more self-reliant behaviour as well as a possibility to handle experiences by psychic means. Although the difficulty for the visually impaired to constitute objects has been elaborated in the former literature by, e.g., Nagera & Colonna (1965), this has not been connected to a metapsychological model, nor has the ability to metaphorize been investigated in this connection. The original contribution of this study is a perspective unifying the concretized experiential mode of the visual impaired, their difficulties in handling experiences by psychic means, and a view of how these difficulties might be moderated in a psychotherapeutic treatment.

Accordingly, the totality of this study suggests a picture connecting the four themes to be found in the former literature. It has become clear that all theory building relies on metaphors, and this pertains especially to disciplines studying objects difficult to grasp. Consequently, it is fully understandable that psychoanalytic theory relies heavily on metaphors; this is the first theme. In the literature it has been observed that both world and experiences are often shaped through configurations supplied by bodily sensations and functions. In this work, this is connected to the establishment of a representational basic structure through which the world takes on a shape — and this, naturally, is analogous to the function of linguistic metaphors; this is the second theme. However, the function of general metaphorization might break down. In order to keep up a coherent world the subject may use metaphors that usually have a linking ability, but as the conditions for this linking fail, the metaphors break down into so called "concretized" ones; this is the third theme. In a psychodynamic treatment the conditions for a connecting faculty might become improved, and moreover, stereotypical metaphorizations can become activated into a vital representative linking, and this provides a possibility to explore the agency demanding a combination of representations; this is the fourth theme.

The metapsychological model outlined in this work appears to make the metaphorizing function more understandable, and it also appears to offer a perspective on the conditions of this most essential function. The clinical studies seem to give empirical support to the perspective on the faculty under study.
IMPLICATIONS ON CLINICAL PRACTICE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As stated above, it has been generally acknowledged that the workings of the mind can be viewed through the theory of metaphor. The result of this study is a view of how a general metaphorization of the mind can be pictured, as well as a picture of conditions in which this function fails.

In all forms of psychological treatment an understanding of the patient’s mental world is of importance; this includes an understanding of the functions building the experiential world. A general understanding of the workings of the mind is of help to the helping professional as it gives him knowledge utilisable in the attempt to understand the individual world of the patient. The implications of this study on clinical practice mainly lies here; the results presented may sharpen the eye of the clinician, thus helping him understand the individual – possibly inhibited – functions of the patient’s mind. An enhanced understanding implies a refined ability to intervene, and, thus, an enhanced ability to help the patient.

This can be exemplified by the results of the essay on transference. For the patient, the spontaneous transference is a lived experience, not a metaphor. If the helping professional has the view that this transference in structure de facto is a metaphor, he has an enhanced ability to help the patient into work where the stereotypical relational configuration is “opened up”. When the transference is conceived as a metaphor for the professional, it may become a living, workable metaphor for the patient, too. In an analogous manner the findings regarding violent men and the visually impaired might promote an understanding that may help professionals working with these categories of patients.

This study can be said to provide a rough and general outline concerning the ability to metaphorize. Being an integrative study, the various fields investigated have not been deeply elaborated. Furthermore, the findings are to a certain degree suggestions in need of further empirical studies in order to rest on a reliable validation. Elaborate case studies could monitor the possible transformations in the ability to metaphorize – it would be valuable, e.g., to follow up changes in the transference in the light of the model here presented – and this might also refine the presented picture. The same can be said regarding the experiential worlds of both violent men and the visually impaired.

A theoretical study on the possibility to use the findings in this study in object relational theory could widen the view of the possibilities to utilise the presented model in clinical practice. Furthermore, questions of an inter-disciplinary nature arise from this study; these include such broad topics as the similarities and differences between ways to
conceptualise representations in psychology and in the theory of literature, as well as philosophical questions concerning the representatative functions.
REFERENCES


Psychoanal., 78: 997-1015.


